(Note: Supporting information for this presentation can be downloaded in a Powerpoint file [1 M].)

The safety projects under way in each program area are determined to some extent by the type of funding provided to DOE. The agency receives funding from two sources. One is direct funding to DOE through the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Committee. The other source is the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID), who then transfers the money to DOE.

In fiscal year 1996, DOE was appropriated $30 million. U.S. AID provided about $25 million, for a total of $55 million. In fiscal year 1997, DOE received $45 million for the safety programs. (The Chornobyl Shelter work was not included in those funds.) U.S. AID provided another $36 million, for a total of $81 million. Fiscal year 1997 probably is going to be our biggest year in terms of funding.

This fiscal year, DOE received $35 million directly. Based on the Congressional language and discussions with U.S. AID, we anticipate that we'll receive about $30 million from U.S. AID this year for safety programs.

Last year and this year, the U.S. AID money was earmarked specifically for two countries. Ukraine received the bulk of the 1997 money. This year, $25 million of the U.S.AID funds are for Ukraine. The other $5 million is going to be for Armenia. Further, those funds are usually directed at specific projects. For example, the Ukrainian funds are for simulators, safety parameter display systems, and training.

Our largest element in terms of both the number of projects and funding is in the operational safety area. It represents our emphasis, where we think the largest risk probably is.

The first project area, which is mature and reaching completion, is implementing day-to-day operational procedures at the plants.

Another project area just now getting started is configuration management. Many of these plants do not have very good configuration control. Most of the plants have only design drawings, not as-built drawings. The configuration management systems are being established to ensure that a nuclear power plant's physical configuration and layout meet the design basis for the plant and that all design documentation is up to date.

Via the training projects, DOE is transferring the Systematic Approach to Training methodology to the host countries. Historically, more of a mentoring approach had been used, in which the quality of the training was dependent on the person doing the training and how well he, in turn, had been trained. The training projects are providing the host countries with the more systematic training methodology. We have developed some sample training courses in several areas, and provided those to the countries, who now are transferring that training methodology and some of the courses to other plant sites beyond the initial plant sites with which we started.

The simulator projects comprise a large effort in terms of funding and amount of activity. Many simulator projects are ongoing in both Russia and Ukraine. The simulator projects focus primarily on improving training of the control room operators.

Quality assurance is yet another project area just getting under way.

Projects also are addressing safety maintenance and nondestructive examination issues. DOE has provided equipment and training for safety maintenance for maintaining nuclear power plant equipment important to safety.

Engineering and technology projects are reducing risks by upgrading the physical safety systems of nuclear power plants. U.S. experts are transferring tools and equipment for effective fire protection and improved radiation confinement at Smolensk, Zaporizhzhya, Leningrad, and Armenia NPPs. Most of those activities have been completed, except at Armenia NPP.

We also developed guidelines for performing a safe shutdown analysis in the event of a fire. The guidelines are now being used in studies at Smolensk NPP in Russia and at Zaporizhzhya NPP in Ukraine.

Mobile pumping systems for emergency cooling and firefighting have been provided to Kursk and Novovoronezh NPPs.

The focus of the engineering and technology projects is on technology transfer, on providing the host countries with the means to do the safety system upgrades on their own. A good example is fire doors. We've helped Ukraine establish an in-country fire door manufacturing capability, and also helped a manufacturer in Russia with the help of U.S. industry. Another example involves emergency direct-current power supplies. We provided backup power supplies to Kola and Kursk NPPs and now are working with Russia to establish an indigenous battery manufacturer who can provide seismically qualified batteries and battery racks.

Another set of projects is aimed at improving the reliability of circuit breakers, motor-operated isolation valves, and electronic control-and-protection system by providing state-of-the-art equipment or transferring the technology so Russian firms can manufacture improved equipment, so we're trying to transfer some of that technology to them.

Safety parameter display systems are being developed and provided for many host-country nuclear power plants. These systems are focused on operator safety more than on equipment upgrades. The first system developed and delivered now is operational at Kursk NPP. The next system to become operational is at Chornobyl. Additional systems will be installed at other RBMKs. Novovoronezh Units 3 and 4 each are installing U.S.-provided safety parameter display systems. An extensive effort is under way to provide safety parameter display systems to the VVER-1000 plants in Ukraine. The first two of those systems should be installed this summer.

In plant safety assessments, the focus is on enabling the host countries and plant operators to do the safety assessment themselves. DOE projects are providing training and technical support to host-country specialists. In Russia, the projects are focused on meeting the requirements of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) requirements for the four oldest plant sites (Leningrad, Kola, Novovoronezh, and Kursk). In Ukraine, all plant sites except Chornobyl have safety assessments under way. As part of the safety assessment work, plant component reliability databases are being constructed.

DOE is collaborating with Ukraine on a dry cask, spent fuel storage system at Zaporizhzhya NPP.

We provided some sample baskets and storage casks but the main focus was to transfer the manufacturing technology so that Ukraine could make its own storage casks.

The final program element is in the regulatory area. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the lead responsibility and does most of the work in this area. The DOE focus is really on two things. One is to support our safety projects. Many of them need regulatory approval—like safety parameter display systems or simulators—so we worked with the regulatory agencies to enable them to approve the upgrades we're trying to implement. The second is the nuclear fuel cycle. We helped the regulator in regulating fuel cycle facilities in Russia.

At Chornobyl, the U.S. team worked with Ukraine to establish the Slavutych Laboratory for International Research and Technology as part of the Chornobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste, and Radioecology. DOE also is involved in some preliminary decontamination and decommissioning work in preparation for the eventual shutdown of Chornobyl NPP. Fire safety and operational safety upgrades are under way for Unit 3; some safety maintenance equipment and a safety parameter display system have been provided as well.

DOE also is working in a preliminary role to help set the stage for the Shelter Implementation Plan that EBRD is going to effect with funding from several countries. The areas in which we are working are personnel safety and ventilation stack stabilization.

At one of our host-country plants, a pressurizer relief valve became stuck in the open position. The operators were having difficulty getting the plant under control and understanding what was going on.

An operator who was not on watch happened by the control room and saw all the confusion and stuck his head in and tried to figure out what was going on. This operator had been to some exchange visits in the United States and had trained on a simulator and used symptom-based emergency operating procedures.

When he saw the event going on, he realized it was the same thing he had seen at the simulator in the United States. So he suggested some courses of actions based on the symptom-based approach rather than the more deterministic approach that the operators were using.

It was reported to us that the plant operators calmed down and felt like they had the situation under control, once they had his help. Eventually the plant recovered without incident.

This feedback suggests that we are making a difference.

(Video shown: Safety Parameter Display System. Produced by NIKIET.)

Q: What's the future of the program in the Central and Eastern European countries?

MR. REISTER: With a couple of exceptions I think our efforts in the Central and Eastern European countries would be reduced somewhat. These countries have the funds to some extent to take care of their own problems now. The exceptions are Lithuania and Bulgaria. Our efforts in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia are being reduced.

Q: Regarding the budget, you had said that AID is going to give you $30 million and that's earmarked for Ukraine and Armenia. How does DOE decide, for example, with the other $5 million, how to spread that out amongst the different countries and projects? And how have you done that in the past when DOE appropriations and U.S. AID funds were more equal, as in 1996, for example?

MR. REISTER: Earlier we had funds from U.S. AID that were not really earmarked for specific countries. In that case, the allocations were really driven by the number of projects we had ongoing and balancing the funding across the different countries. More recently the funding has been earmarked. For example, this year, of the expected $30 million, $25 million is specifically for Ukraine; we don't really have any choice in that case. The other $5 million would be for Armenia. So it's really at that point, just a question of projects and the Armenian project—discussions with the host country and with our experts on what the most important projects are, especially in Armenia.

In Ukraine's case, the appropriations language actually spells out three areas for which the money was provided: simulators, safety parameter display systems, and training. So we really didn't have any flexibility outside of those three areas for the U.S. AID funding we received for Ukraine. For other efforts we wanted to do in Ukraine, we used the DOE funding.

We still try to do some balancing across countries, trying to hit what we think are the most bang-for-the-buck projects and the most risk-significant areas. There's a lot of pushing and pulling on where we allocate the funds. And of course, we have to negotiate with host countries, too. They have some say in what the projects are. It is a complex process and difficult at times. And of course we get a lot of help from the folks in the audience about suggestions on where we should best spend our resources.

Q: One of your bullets addressed liability protection for U.S. companies. Could you expand upon that please? Where do we stand on that?

MR. REISTER: We continue to work with other U.S. government agencies—the State Department in particular--to encourage these countries to sign up with international nuclear liability conventions and pass domestic nuclear liability legislation to protect U.S. and other foreign companies that would want to do business in their country. We've had some success and we've had some areas a little bit less than successful so far. We continue to make some progress.

Most of the projects we're working on now are operating under bilateral agreements we have with host countries that provide for nuclear indemnification for the companies doing the work. Some companies have been willing to work under that arrangement and some have not. But so far we have not found a project that we wanted to do that we couldn't find somebody willing to do the work. So at this point it really is not hindering any of our safety projects.

The main concern we have, and I'm sure that most companies have with the liability legislation is, they'd like to do commercial work in these countries and our agreements don't cover commercial activities in these countries. So we continue to press and try to encourage these countries to complete their nuclear liability activities and conventions and legislation to allow all foreign companies to do commercial work in these countries.

Q: What is the status of the legislation?

MR. ARCHDEACON: Ukraine has signed and ratified the Vienna convention but, at least as of two weeks ago, had not yet passed domestic legislation bringing it into force. Russia I do not think has signed or ratified the Vienna Convention. Eastern European countries, most of them, have signed, ratified, and brought it into force.

Q: From what pot of money is the $13 million coming for the U.S. contribution to the Chornobyl heat plant project?

MR. REISTER: That is money provided to us from the State Department, to U.S. AID. It is not a direct appropriation to DOE. The Chornobyl initiatives are funded in the same way. The appropriation was the Freedom Support Act.

Q: Notably absent from the U.S. AID allocated funds for 1998 was money for Russia. Will you be spending Department funds on Russia in 1998?

MR. REISTER: Yes, we will. In 1998, DOE received about $35 million, and using round numbers, about $15 million of that is probably for projects in Russia and about, I guess $7 or $8 million is for projects in Ukraine. But of course that's on top of the $25 million we're getting from U.S. AID for spending in Ukraine.

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