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4.0 State Department Perspectives on International Nuclear Safety
Speaker: Carol Kessler; Senior Coordinator; Nuclear Reactor Safety; U.S. Department of State The U.S. government assistance program for improving the safety of Soviet-designed reactors is 5 years old. We have not been able to accomplish as much as we had hoped when the work began in 1992. A primary reason has been the delay in economic and energy sector reform. U.S. assistance is directed at several fronts, including supporting economic and energy sector reforms. Energy sector reform is aimed at building a more attractive energy sector for domestic and international investment. Nuclear safety must be viewed in the broader context of these overall reform programs as these reforms will enable revenue streams needed to pay for safety. U.S. support is integrated with other multilateral assistance to ensure efficient and effective safety assistance with the limited resources available. The State Department's Ambassador Morningstar, the overall coordinator for assistance to the New Independent States, has been instrumental in securing congressional support for U.S. safety assistance. It is important to recognize that U.S.-funded safety work is not supporting the continued operation of unsafe reactors. Certain Soviet-designed reactor types have distinct safety problems. The RBMK reactor is susceptible to power instabilities and lacks a modern containment system to prevent release of radiation to the environment. The VVER-440/230 reactor has no containment system and no emergency core-cooling system. A safety analysis report recently was completed for Lithuania's RBMK reactors. This report brings to light additional, cross-cutting problems inherent in the RBMK reactor. In contrast, the VVER-440/213 and VVER-1000 models have the potential for safer long-term operation. Making the distinction between the two groups of older and newer reactors is important because the focus of safety work for each is different. For the RBMK and VVER-440/230 reactor types, the work is aimed primarily at upgrading inadequate safety systems to reduce urgent risks until the reactors can be shut down. For the VVER-440/312 and VVER-1000 models, work focuses more on providing modern safety technologies that can be sustained over time by the host countries as these reactors continue to operate. The United States is interested in seeing strong safety cultures established in the countries where Soviet-designed reactors operate. In addition, U.S. involvement is based on the premise that the support eventually will transition from federal assistance to the commercial sector. Good examples of successes are in Hungary and the Czech Republic, where nuclear safety cultures are being established that have the potential for becoming commercially viable. 4.1 G-7 Nuclear Safety Working GroupThe group of industrialized nations called G-7 established the G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group in 1992. The nations that make up the G-7 are Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States. The G-7 also includes the European Commission. G-7 work is coordinated with and complemented by that of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Nuclear Energy Agency, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank. The goal of the G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group is for the recipient countries to establish self-sustaining safety practices that meet international standards. Meeting this goal requires transferring technologies, strengthening the regulatory organizations, improving operational safety, and establishing a sustainable safety culture. The United States is a leader among the G-7 nations in providing assistance to upgrade the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. The United States is the largest single G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group. The G-7 activities currently focus strongly on Russia and Ukraine. Lithuania is also of concern because of its large RBMK reactors for which an in-depth safety analysis was just completed. Bulgaria has a new government in place that is expected to encourage the growth of democracy, which should strengthen our nuclear safety work with them. Armenia has been a cooperative partner with the G-7 nations and the rest of the international community. Armenia's two nuclear power reactors were shut down after a major earthquake in December 1988. In 1995, the country restarted reactor Unit 2, which provides 40% of the nation's electricity. However, the Armenian government recognizes that the reactor does not meet international safety standards and has agreed to close it by 2004. The World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are working with Armenia on projects for replacement power for that country. G-7 activities with Russia have been building on the momentum achieved by the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, a presidential-level event in April 1996. At that summit, world leaders held discussions on the importance of working together to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. A key area of focus evolving from the summit was that nuclear safety be given the highest priority rather than the production of electricity as was the case in much of the Soviet Union. 4.2 RussiaThe United States is supporting an important agreement between the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Russian Federation through a Nuclear Safety Account. This grant agreement provides $90 million in assistance to Russia's Leningrad, Kola, and Novovoronezh plants to support nuclear safety improvement. In return, Russia has committed to three activities in support of a sustainable nuclear safety strategy. One is conducting in-depth safety assessments that can provide the basis for a new licensing regime. The second activity is to use the results of the safety assessments to determine whether nuclear power plants would qualify for a long-term operating license or must prepare for shutdown. The third commitment by Russia is to develop strategies for strengthening its energy sector to make it more commercially viable and able to provide revenues needed to secure safer reactor operations. A stronger energy sector provides a foundation for future shutdown of existing high-risk nuclear power plants by creating additional, stable sources of electricity as replacement power. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has proposed to work with Russia to develop two investment strategies corresponding to two areas of Russia. One is the Northwest region, covering the Kola and Leningrad reactors. The other would be for the Central region, covering Kursk and Novovoronezh. Russia is interested in restarting Kursk Unit 1, an early-generation RBMK reactor. The United States does not support its restart. The United States is asking Russia to conduct a safety assessment before restarting the reactor. Russia is moving forward, but has not yet passed domestic nuclear liability legislation. This legislation will offer the commercial provider of safety upgrades protection from liability for nuclear-related malfunctions or accidents. Such laws will facilitate provision of advanced safety technology to Russia. The Russian government must now take the step of ratifying the Vienna convention on liability. Ratification is expected in the next 6 months. Adherence to international nuclear liability conventions is needed to help ensure the effective commercial trade in nuclear equipment and technology for nuclear programs. A new liability convention is being negotiated to allow the United States to enter into treaty relations on nuclear liability with Russia and other countries. International experts have nearly reached agreement on a text for this convention. In the next 3 to 6 months, we hope the text will be completed. At that time, the International Atomic Energy Agency will open a diplomatic conference to formally negotiate this treaty. The timing of this depends on the timely approval of the governments of the countries involved. Strengthening the energy sector in the New Independent States is a primary goal of the G-7 Nuclear Safety Working Group. The United States is interested in stimulating reforms in banking and taxation to encourage private investment. Russia and the United States conducted a study last year to look at proposed energy sector initiatives, including those for the nuclear sector for domestic and international investment. Implementation of proposed initiatives will not be possible without reforms that allow Russia to pay back loans from lenders. The Northwest region of Russia is of particular interest for potential energy sector investment. Because of its connections and proximity to Europe, the power plants in Russia's Northwest region will likely have a greater ability to pay back loans in hard currency sooner than other regions in Russia. Another issue for the G-7 is safe management of nuclear waste. The International Atomic Energy Agency is negotiating an international convention on safe management of waste and spent nuclear fuel. Rather than being prescriptive, the convention sets broad goals for safe management of nuclear waste. Key issues under negotiation are whether spent fuel is defined as waste and how to handle military waste. Russia lacks resources to store and treat liquid radioactive waste on a broad scale. The United States is encouraging Russia to adhere to the London Dumping Convention, the protocol that prohibits ocean disposal of nuclear waste. In support of this goal, the United States and Norway are helping Russia build a liquid-waste treatment facility in Murmansk. The Japanese are doing the same thing for Far Eastern Russia. 4.3 UkraineThe G-7 group's work with Ukraine has focused on the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding signed with Ukraine in 1995. In this memorandum, Ukraine agreed to shut down the Chornobyl nuclear power plant by 2000 in exchange for international grant and loan support to help with safety and other problems at Chornobyl and to strengthen Ukraine's power sector. A key aspect of this support is restructuring of the Ukrainian power sector, which involves developing an electricity market and a financially viable power utility in Ukraine. Efforts directed toward these goals have been somewhat successful. Ukraine has established a fledgling electricity market. Thermal power plants are bidding to provide power. The goal is for all electricity to be offered on a competitive basis, through the electricity market. A key to making this approach successful is that customers, especially industry, must pay for their electricity on time and in hard currency. Currently, because of Ukraine's fragile economic situation, this is rare. The Ukrainian government subsidizes much of the electricity provided. Another part of the Memorandum of Understanding for Chornobyl shutdown concerns energy sector investment. For Ukraine, the completion of Rivne Unit 4 and Khmelnytskyy Unit 2 reactors is a top priority. The reactors are partially completed. Ukraine's Minister Kostenko told the G-7 that the Chornobyl nuclear power plant will not close unless Ukraine receives funding to complete the Rivne Unit 4 and Khmelnytskyy Unit 2 reactors for replacement power. The G-7 position is that any consideration of investment in the plants must be proven as part of a least-cost strategy and must be financially and environmentally viable. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development contracted an independent least-cost study of the two unfinished reactors and established a panel of international experts to study the issue. The panel concluded that completion of the two plants was not part of the lowest-cost investment alternative for Ukraine's power sector. This conclusion was based on two key factors. First, Ukraine has excess generating capacity from other sources, especially thermal plants, that is not being used because the country cannot afford to pay for the necessary fuel in the current economic climate. Second, a $1 billion loan would be necessary for Ukraine to complete construction of both reactors. The nuclear utility of Ukraine must be able to pay back that loan, which is unlikely in Ukraine's currently unstable economic and political environment. Instead, the panel recommended that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development might consider smaller, less risky, more diverse investments that would have a broader impact on strengthening Ukraine's overall energy sector. The European Union is funding a feasibility study on the costs of completing the unfinished reactors at Rivne and Khmelnytskyy. It is difficult to identify the degree of completion at the two reactors; more information from Ukraine, as well as on-site inspections, are needed. Other potential energy sector projects are being considered or are under way in energy transmission and in thermal and hydroelectric plant improvements and energy efficiency. Over the last 9 months in Ukraine, the energy sector has undergone significant reform. Ukraine is planning to consolidate its electricity sector into seven utilities. The nuclear utility structure still is evolving. It will cover the nuclear plants in Ukraine except Chornobyl. The United States' support for the Chornobyl Memorandum of Understanding focuses on several efforts:
The issue of social impacts is an important one for Ukraine. The community of Slavutych is economically dependent on Chornobyl. Without replacement jobs, closing Chornobyl would leave the highly specialized work force idle and shut down an entire community. Chornobyl personnel are highly skilled and well-trained; many have academic backgrounds at the master's or doctoral levels. Their skills and experience make them ideal candidates for future work associated with shelter repair and reactor decommissioning. The Ukrainians recently developed a worker profile, showing the numbers and types of workers expected at various time periods through Chornobyl closure. This profile will be a valuable tool in helping the employees find other business opportunities. The recently established Chornobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radioecology is designed in part to address these socioeconomic needs while providing Ukraine with a unique technical resource. Ukraine established the Center in Slavutych in 1996 with the support of the United States. U.S. specialists are working with Chornobyl Center and plant representatives to transition existing Chornobyl workers to the Center. Once appropriately trained, the workers will conduct nuclear safety, decommissioning, and environmental activities for Chornobyl and other nuclear power plants in Ukraine. The United States and other countries are providing support for specific technical projects. Another way to help the Slavutych community become more economically self-sustaining is to develop business opportunities there. There will be a conference in Washington, D.C., later in 1997 to promote such opportunities. One plan being considered is to employ workers at a factory that would manufacture equipment for energy efficiency. The United States is holding the G-7 summit the third week in June in Denver, Colorado. One focus is nuclear safety. If we succeed to define a Ukraine/G-7 approved project for stabilizing the Chornobyl Unit 4 shelter, we hope to use the summit to announce G-7 financial support for the project. At issue is how to deal with the large masses of highly radioactive fuel that melted and hardened during the 1986 accident. Chornobyl and Ukrainian nuclear officials originally wanted to move these fuel-containing masses, as they are called, out of the shelter to a temporary disposal site, to reduce the risk to workers who monitor conditions inside the shelter and to demonstrate progress in cleanup. G-7 nations, including the United States, were concerned about the potential radiological hazards associated with an activity of such magnitude. In a recent workshop, the G-7 and Ukraine agreed to develop a phased shelter implementation plan. This plan will contain decision points regarding timing and extent of shelter stabilization and new shelter development, and development of a strategy for eventual long-term removal of the fuel-containing masses. The plan will identify studies and engineering designs needed to provide the basis for the decisions.
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