Speaker: Laurin Dodd; Manager; International Nuclear Safety Program Office; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

U.S. involvement at Chornobyl began formally with the December 1995 signing of a memorandum of understanding between Ukraine and the G-7 countries. In that memorandum, Ukraine agreed to shut down all its Chornobyl reactors by 2000. The G-7 agreed to provide $2.3 billion for efforts to

• help remediate current risks at Chornobyl nuclear power plant

• support Ukraine's move toward energy efficiency

• help alleviate socioeconomic impacts of Chornobyl's closure.

U.S. Department of Energy's activities under way at Chornobyl are helping to fulfill the U.S. commitments based on that signing.

However, U.S. efforts there actually began months before the agreement with Ukraine was signed. In 1992, the G-7 had met and agreed to collaborate with Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union to reduce risks at certain Soviet-designed reactors. The U.S. Department of Energy subsequently began working with various host countries to improve the safety of their Soviet-designed reactors. As part of that endeavor, representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy met in June 1995 with Chornobyl plant management to discuss ways in which they might work together to enhance safety at Chornobyl.

At first, the American delegation was met with cynicism tinged with suspicion. After all, nine years already had passed since the 1986 Chornobyl disaster--and no one in the international community yet had even offered, much less actually done anything, to help. The United States, represented by the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, ultimately convinced the Ukrainians that the Americans were serious. Initial talks soon led to formal agreements, and several safety-enhancing efforts were started at the Chornobyl plant itself.

Now, a year and a half later, much progress has been made in both safety-related enhancements and relationships with the people of Chornobyl. U.S. Department of Energy's efforts there now are under way in four primary areas:

• remediating safety risks at Chornobyl Unit 3 while it continues to operate

• cooperating with other nations to address and resolve safety issues at Chornobyl Unit 4 (the Shelter or Ukrytie)

• planning with Chornobyl staff for plant decontamination and decommissioning

• working with Ukraine to develop the Chornobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radioecology.

This work at Chornobyl is full of challenges. Perhaps one of the most overarching is the socioeconomic impacts of total plant closure.

Slavutych, about 65 kilometers (40 miles) east of the plant, was completed in 1988 to provide housing and services for plant operating personnel. It replaces the town of Prypiyat, abandoned immediately after the Unit 4 accident because of radioactive contamination. Slavutych and the 27,000 people who live there depend entirely upon the Chornobyl plant for their economic well-being; the town has no other major business. Furthermore, despite their overall high level of education, Slavutych residents remain relatively immobile and isolated from the rest of the nation and the world. In the absence of alternative employment opportunities, ultimate closure of Chornobyl's reactors guarantees adverse impacts on the local economy.

8.1 Fire Safety Upgrades at Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant

Bechtel has been providing fire protection upgrades for the host countries as part of the U.S. Department of Energy's cooperative nuclear safety work since 1995. This discussion focuses on fire protection upgrades under way at the Chornobyl plant. The Chornobyl plant has four reactor units, but only Unit 3 is currently producing power. Unit 1 was shut down in November 1996. Unit 2 was closed after a turbine hall fire in 1991. Unit 4 was the site of the tragic accident in 1986.

To determine what fire protection components the plant requires, Bechtel met with plant staff and management. Then, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the participants reached agreement on specific projects that meet the selection criteria. Fire protection measures for Chornobyl Unit 3 include the following:

• fire doors

• fire detection systems

• penetration sealant materials

• fire-retardant cable coating materials

• floor coating materials to replace the existing plastic floor sheeting material

• fire protective coating materials for structural steel in the turbine hall

• fire brigade support.

Each of these items is discussed in more detail here.

Chornobyl, like many older Soviet-designed nuclear power plants, has fire doors made of wood. Bechtel and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are working with a company in Kyiv to manufacture fire doors that are qualified to the International Standards Organization (ISO) standards. The contract for this work also includes the design and installation of the doors. Two-hundred-fifty fire doors are scheduled to be delivered and installed later this year.

Existing smoke and heat detectors at Chornobyl often give spurious signals and are unreliable. Therefore, modern fire detection systems were given a high priority. Bechtel has identified two U.S. companies that are certified to supply fire detection components to the Ukrainian nuclear industry. Specifically, the certification meets new regulations imposed by Ukraine on all materials since April 1996. Sample equipment was sent to the Chornobyl plant for review. The plant is working with its design agency to begin the design process.

Many penetrations at the Chornobyl plant either need replacement or were never properly sealed during the construction phase. The plant has defined the quantities of material required to seal these penetrations and the schedule for the deliveries. Plant personnel have asked that material be delivered approximately every six months, which gives them time to apply it incrementally before the shelf life expires on any one batch. Bechtel has selected a U.S. supplier that will provide materials and will train staff to apply them to seal penetration openings. The first shipment has arrived; subsequent deliveries will occur every six months through September 1998.

Chornobyl was the first plant to ask about fire protective coating materials for structural steel roof trusses. Chornobyl staff want to avoid an accident at Unit 3 such as the one that occurred in Unit 2 in 1991, in which the roof caved in after 15 minutes when the turbine caught fire. Because no U.S. supplier could be found that was qualified to the Ukrainian standards to produce this material, Bechtel sought a certified German manufacturer whose coating already has been applied to structural steel at some Russian nuclear power plants. Negotiations are under way with a Kyiv contractor to supply and install the material.

The operating deck levels of the turbine halls in many of the Soviet-designed nuclear power plants are covered with a very thick plastic sheet material to allow simplicity of decontamination. Bechtel now is working with a U.S. supplier to certify its product for use in Russian nuclear power plants. Ukrainian representatives are witnessing the testing program for this material in Russia. Eventually, Bechtel hopes to have the Ukrainian authorities evaluate the results of the Russian tests to allow use of the material in Ukrainian nuclear power plants.

To upgrade the plant fire brigade, Bechtel is supplying modern fire suits and adjustable hose stream nozzles. Germany already has supplied new breathing apparatus equipment, and Ukraine has supplied new radio equipment for communications during fire emergencies.

In addition to the equipment and materials described here, it is important for the Ukrainians to acquire the capability to identify and evaluate systematically potential fire hazards at their plants. Bechtel and Burns & Roe, working with the U.S. Department of Energy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Brookhaven National laboratory, and other U.S. industry experts, have developed a fire hazards methodology document. This document, Reactor Core Protection Evaluation Methodology for Fires at Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants⁽⁾, is designed to enable plant personnel to assess fire hazards and identify the most important and cost-effective changes in procedures and equipment. Brookhaven National Laboratory is providing training for plant representatives, including Chornobyl, to use this methodology to identify and rank fire hazards. Later this year, follow-up training will be provided at the pilot plant in Russia (Smolensk) and the pilot plant in Ukraine (Zaporizhzhya).

8.2 Emergency Operating Instructions

Emergency operating instructions (EOIs) define actions that nuclear power plant operators must take in an emergency to stabilize the reactor and mitigate consequences of an accident or other abnormal event. Two types of EOIs are used in today's nuclear power plants: event-based and symptom-based.

Before the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, event-based instructions were used at U.S. plants. The EOIs for many Soviet-designed nuclear power plants still are of this type. Event-based instructions require operators to first identify the cause of a problem, such as loss of power, before responding.

By comparison, symptom-based instructions enable faster and more effective decision making. These instructions specify responses to changes in plant parameters, such as reactor pressure, water level, or temperature. By responding to those changes, operators can stabilize a reactor without first having to determine the underlying cause of the change. The time saved can prevent a disaster. Symptom-based EOIs now are used at most U.S. plants and in plants of many other countries around the world.

Ciel Consultants, Inc., is a key member of the U.S. team working to transfer the technology for developing symptom-based EOIs to host countries with Soviet-designed reactors. In close cooperation with managers of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, Ciel is teaching procedures writers at that plant how to produce symptom-based EOIs for the still-operating Unit 3 reactor.

Chornobyl staff interest in developing symptom-based EOIs for their plant began in late 1995, when plant personnel toured an American nuclear power plant to observe how such instructions are implemented in the United States. Chornobyl subsequently asked the United States for technical assistance with EOI development.

In March 1996, the U.S. team delivered state-of-the-art computer equipment and software to Chornobyl to support the EOI development process. Ciel began its collaboration with Chornobyl procedures writers in June 1996 by traveling to Ukraine to introduce formally the concept and philosophy of symptom-based EOIs. Ciel described the underlying concepts, provided a history of EOI development in the United States, and outlined the elements of a symptom-based EOI program for Chornobyl personnel. Plant management subsequently created a development team to draft symptom-based EOIs for Unit 3.

The Chornobyl team, working closely with Ciel, has progressed quickly through most of the major steps involved in the instruction development process. By mid-February 1997, the Chornobyl procedures writers had

• Developed final drafts of flowcharts and underlying technical documentation for five EOIs.

• Created a writer's guide and obtained approval for its use.

• Developed the EOI program document and received approval.

• Designed the programs for verifying and validating the newly developed EOIs.

The Chornobyl procedures writers have drafted their plan for training plant operators to use the EOIs. In addition, they have completed the support instructions in flowchart format for the Chornobyl EOIs.

In mid-February 1997, Ciel staff were onsite in Ukraine participating in an analytical workshop session with the Chornobyl writers. During that session, they

• Reviewed the most current drafts of the EOI flowcharts, writer's guide, and associated technical documentation.

• Reviewed and finalized the draft EOI support instructions.

• Finalized the plans and procedures for verification and validation.

• Trained the writers on techniques for validation scenarios.

• Reviewed the operator training program.

Ciel credits the rapid progress on this effort to the high level of commitment demonstrated by its Chornobyl partners. Chornobyl management's contributions to the effort also have been a key factor. For example, throughout this association, the Chornobyl procedures writers have shared the travel responsibility associated with this collaboration by alternating trips to each others' countries with the Ciel consultants. Based on past experience with this effort, Ciel representatives estimate that the EOI program for Chornobyl will be implemented fully by the end of September 1997.

8.3 An Overview of Projects at the Chornobyl Shelter

Speakers: Dennis Kreid; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; and Jack Woods; Stone & Webster Engineering Company

The Chornobyl accident in April 1986 destroyed the Unit 4 reactor, leaving 190 metric tons of highly radioactive fuel in a twisted mass. To contain the contamination, plant personnel worked steadily for the next seven months, constructing a massive steel and concrete structure over the devastated reactor.

The 20-story shelter (or Ukrytie, as the Ukrainians call it) is deteriorating. Moisture from rain, cleanup work, and condensation has found its way inside and is slowly dissolving the fuel-containing masses into radioactive dust, contributing to a potential criticality state. In addition, the shelter itself, erected partially upon the damaged remains of the Unit 4 building, is unstable structurally; it also is sighted in an earthquake zone rated 4 to 5 on the Richter scale. These factors pose risks to workers assigned to shelter cleanup activities.

Recognizing those risks, Ukraine and members of the international community have launched efforts to improve the safety of shelter operations and to convert the shelter and damaged reactor into an ecologically safe system. The United States is supporting those efforts in two key ways:

• working with Ukraine to supply Chornobyl shelter workers with basic equipment to meet immediate safety needs

• working with the international group to develop final solutions to the structural and other problems with the shelter.

8.3.1 Chornobyl Shelter Safety Equipment Needs

The work to supply Chornobyl shelter workers with basic safety equipment began with an initial assessment of shelter needs in May 1996. The U.S. team compiled a lengthy list.

It became readily apparent that workers involved in Chornobyl cleanup activities had some major basic needs for certain kinds of safety improvements. Further, it also was obvious that neither the Chornobyl plant nor shelter organization had the financial resources with which to obtain those improvements (equipment or training).

The U.S. team set out to make that needed equipment and training available to shelter workers. The overriding criterion guiding the team's choices was that the equipment and training must yield immediate or near-term, direct improvements in worker safety. After applying this criterion, the team chose four emphasis areas:

• dose reduction

• nuclear (criticality) safety monitoring

• dust suppression

• industrial safety enhancements.

The dose reduction effort will provide equipment, training, and mentoring to improve worker radiological protection and infrastructure. As part of this task area, the United States is providing shelter workers with electronic dosimetry, dose-tracking software, and portable survey instruments. The radiation protection technicians will receive standards-based training. Engineered controls and dose modeling software will be provided. The U.S. team also located American supplies of excess calibration sources, radiation-protection clothing, and respirators for the shelter workers. As of mid-February, deliveries of approved equipment items had started and will extend through September 1997.

Under the nuclear criticality monitoring task, U.S. experts will install neutron monitoring equipment inside the shelter. Eight detector pods will be provided for monitoring six key fuel-containing locations in the shelter. The monitoring will help assess causes of observed changes in neutron activity levels, define any measures that might be required to mitigate those changes, and help ensure worker safety. System delivery is expected by July 1997. The data collected with the system will provide a basis for assessing longer-term needs for criticality monitoring in the shelter.

The dust suppression equipment is intended to improve radiological conditions inside the shelter. The United States will provide three airless sprayer units; those units already have been purchased. Shelter cleanup workers will use the portable self-contained sprayers to apply decontamination solution and fixatives in shelter periphery access ways and support areas. Efforts funded by the Chornobyl shelter are directed at developing a system for dust suppression in the event of a major shelter structural failure. Workers plan a demonstration test of a Russian-developed foam product, EKOR, for application in severe dust conditions.

Equipment for industrial safety also is being purchased. Basic items such as hard hats, fall-protection devices, and lightweight tools are expected to yield immediate improvements in worker safety. Much of the equipment on order, such as jackhammers, compressors, drills, and saws, is to provide improved access ways and support areas in the shelter peripheries and to provide access to areas inside the shelter not yet entered since the 1986 accident.

The U.S. Department of Energy has approved the purchase of all safety equipment mentioned above. Most of that equipment is on order already; delivery of all will be complete by the end of September 1997. In addition, Chornobyl shelter staff have expressed needs for thermoluminescent dosimetry systems, respirator cleaning and testing, and additional training in dose reduction techniques. A steam-water vapor-vacuum surface cleaner for dust suppression also is on Chornobyl's list. Shelter staff have requested communications equipment (e.g., two-way radios) for use inside the shelter. The U.S. team has sought approval to purchase those items for delivery to the shelter as well. Availability of these items will further develop the shelter infrastructure capabilities for support of the larger forthcoming tasks.

U.S. efforts to make available these types of safety equipment to Chornobyl shelter workers have provided a head start to the European Commission's proposed implementation of short-term measures for the shelter.

8.3.2 International/European Commission Shelter Project Task Descriptions

In May 1996, the United States became involved in an international effort to develop design solutions to structural problems at the Chornobyl shelter enclosing Chornobyl's destroyed Unit 4 reactor. At that time, U.S. technical staff were primarily observers to the work being done by the European Commission. However, between May and August, the U.S. role expanded significantly to that of leader in the effort. The United States arranged to provide the commission with technical help from industry experts in engineering, project management, and costing and scheduling. U.S. industry participants include Stone & Webster Engineering Company, Bechtel National, Parsons Power Group, Science Applications International Corporation, and Scientech.

The commission's long- and short-term measures project ended in October 1996. The group's recommendations were presented in a draft report delivered at the same time. In all, 23 measures were proposed, representing a composite of the best ideas from all alternatives or scenarios considered for the shelter.

In December 1996, the European Commission presented its recommendations to the G-7 and Ukrainian officials at meetings in Slavutych. Those recommendations met with only partial acceptance. Immediately following those meetings, the U.S. International Shelter Project working group was formed. Participants include the industry representatives mentioned above plus technical experts from two U.S. Department of Energy national laboratories. The working group's charge is to complete detailed cost and schedule estimates for the European Commission's recommended measures and to identify those that can be started promptly. The outcome of these activities will help determine the proportion of support to be pledged by each G-7 country on behalf of the Chornobyl shelter work.

In addition to the European Commission, G-7 countries, and the U.S. working group, many host country organizations in Ukraine and Russia play active roles in the efforts to resolve outstanding safety issues at the Chornobyl shelter. From Ukraine, these organizations include the shelter operations department of Chornobyl nuclear power plant, NIISK (the Ukrainian Academy of Engineering Sciences, i.e., the Ukrainian construction institute), the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Interdisciplinary Scientific and Technical Center - Shelter, and the technical center of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, Ukrainian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety. Russian organizations involved in Chornobyl efforts are the Khlopin Radium Institute and VNIPIET (All-Russian Planning and Design, Research and Technological Association) in St. Petersburg and the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow.

8.3.3 European Commission Project Results and Short-Term Measures

The European Commission began its Chornobyl Shelter Project in 1992 with an international competition aimed at eliciting design solutions for the disintegrating Chornobyl shelter. From a field of 400 design submissions, the commission selected eight for further investigation. In July 1995, that effort resulted in a design known as the Alliance Shelter 2. However, because of the high costs and massive size of the Alliance design, it was rejected. In May 1996, the European Commission began another international effort, this time to determine alternatives to the Alliance design and to recommend one that would resolve the safety issues at the Chornobyl shelter.

As part of the U.S. Department of Energy's efforts to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors, several U.S. staff became involved with the European Commission work, primarily as observers. By early August 1996, however, those specialists were asked to organize a team of U.S. industry experts to support the commission's efforts to develop a reasonable alternative for the Chornobyl shelter. The newly formed U.S. working group comprised specialists from Stone & Webster Engineering Company, Bechtel National, Inc., Parsons Power Group, Inc., Science Applications International Corporation, and Scientech.

The U.S. working group directive was to help the European Commission develop a technically sound solution to the issues at the Chornobyl shelter and to assist in generating cost estimates from which to develop a financially feasible budget for implementing the solution. The approach taken by the team was to evaluate five scenarios or courses of action and to arrive at a recommended course of action for the commission.

The U.S. working group studied five alternatives:

1. Do nothing; continue current situation.

2. Define and implement short-term measures; continue active risk management as a long-term measure.

3. a. Build a small shelter around the existing shelter; proceed to early removal of fuel-containing debris.

   b. Build a long-lived shelter to contain and confine the existing shelter in case it collapses; proceed to removal of fuel-containing masses when appropriate.

4. Contain and confine the entire shelter with a long-lived earth shelter; proceed to remove fuel with heavy equipment if required.

5. a. Shield, stabilize, and contain the shelter with cementitious material and confine the fuel-containing masses with a long-lived shelter. Proceed to fuel removal when appropriate.

   b. Shield, stabilize, and contain the shelter with cementitious material. Keep the fuel-containing masses in place. Proceed to removal if required.

Based on the evaluation, the U.S. working group is recommending both short- and long-term measures. That recommendation incorporates the best features of each of the five scenarios the team examined. The recommendation comprises four primary activities:

• Reduce the potential for accidental collapse of the existing shelter.

• Reduce the consequences of accidental release of contamination.

• Manage the fuel-containing material inside the shelter; manage the radioactive material in and around the shelter.

• Increase the safety of current shelter operating conditions.

Of those four activities, the team's primary emphasis was on stabilizing the structure of the existing shelter to reduce the potential for accidental collapse.

Each of the four activities involves both short- and long-term measures. The short-term measures will reduce the current hazards and risks, making the existing shelter safer than it is now. The longer-term measures will make the shelter safe by lowering the risks and hazards to levels considered to be reasonable, achievable, and tolerable and by ultimately removing the fuel-containing material now inside.

The course of action recommended by the U.S. working group involves a multi-year effort to be done in three phases. The proposed timeline for implementing the recommended action shows Phase 1 beginning in 1997 with the implementation of 17 short-term measures in four categories:

• structural stabilization

• monitoring

• nuclear safety

• industrial and environmental safety.

Phase 2 entails preparing the shelter for long-term conversion. The U.S. working group has agreed that those preparations include shielding and controlled access, which should proceed in parallel with the short-term measures of Phase I. Also being discussed are construction of a new confinement structure, deconstruction/removal of unstable pieces, and possibly partial removal of fuel-containing material. No decisions have been made on these last three items, however. The schedule projected for Phase 2 extends through 2025.

In Phase 3, the shelter would be converted into an ecologically safe site, some time after the year 2025. Specific tasks in this phase would include replacing the existing structure with one that meets all criteria for ecological safety. Phase 3 also encompasses removal of all remaining fuel-containing material when Ukraine is ready to do so.

The U.S. working group calculated the costs for each of the five scenarios (and subsets) evaluated during this study. The estimated costs range from a low of (U.S.) $180 million for implementing only the short-term measures to $424 million for a new structure consisting of cementitious fill coupled with bridge confinement. On the basis of estimated costs alone, no single long-term structural solution is the clear winner.

In retrospect, the U.S. working group's participation in the European Commission study helped steer the commission away from choosing a single alternative with which to resolve the shelter issues. Instead, the working group guided the commission toward the emplacement of short-term measures as a way to "jump-start"the work while preserving design options for the later phases of the work. The four projects already under way at the shelter as part of the U.S. effort to improve worker safety--dose reduction, nuclear criticality monitoring, dust suppression, and industrial safety equipment enhancements--are congruent with short-term measures recommended by the European Commission's original study.

8.3.4 In Summary

U.S. involvement in the International Shelter Study has facilitated great progress in meeting the safety challenges posed by the Chornobyl shelter. However, much work remains to be done to fully meet those challenges. For that reason, the effort is now best described as "a work in progress."

8.4 Chornobyl Reactor Deactivation, Decontamination, and Decommissioning Project - Concept, Status, and Path Forward

Speaker: Tom Wood; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

The objective of the work is to support the orderly deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning (D,D, &D) of reactor Units 1, 2, and 3 at Chornobyl, consistent with timely reactor shutdown, regional economic stability, and operating safety. The work is aimed at developing a sound technical and regulatory basis for D,D, &D activities for RBMK reactors on an international basis. (RBMK reactors operate in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania.) In addition, the project is intended to foster development of the capability for D,D, &D planning and implementation within the Chornobyl nuclear power plant and the Chornobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radioecology. The D,D, &D project was initiated early this fiscal year based on Ukraine's decision to close Chornobyl Unit 1 earlier than planned because of problems with pressure tube integrity.

The U.S. Department of Energy previously was involved with a study for D&D planning for reactor Unit 1 at the Leningrad nuclear power plant. From that work, it became apparent that the Russian regulatory basis for decommissioning RBMK reactors was insufficient and that the situation likely would be similar in Ukraine. This fact, in addition to the difficulties with operating the Chornobyl site and the overall safety infrastructure in the Ukrainian nuclear industry, pointed to the need for U.S. technical support for Chornobyl D,D, &D. The work demonstrates the willingness of the United States to support Ukraine in solving a challenging problem that is critical to shutting down the reactors by 2000. In addition, early involvement of the United States was determined to be critical to building Ukrainian capabilities in D,D, &D as soon as possible.

Initial work in FY 1997 focused on three tasks:

• Transfer awareness of U.S. D,D, &D technologies and processes to senior Chornobyl and Ukraine regulatory management.

• Conduct a survey of Unit 1 readiness and resources for deactivation. This survey was conducted in February 1997 by engineers from Bechtel Hanford Company and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.

• Clarify risk reduction benefits of deactivation steps. Closing and achieving adequate cleanup of nuclear sites is part of an overall responsible nuclear safety culture that the United States is working with Ukraine to create.

The project concept is to transfer U.S. technology in a three-step process:

• Familiarize personnel with D,D, &D technology used at U.S. Department of Energy sites and commercial reactor sites.

• Select promising technologies for Chornobyl.

• Conduct testing and demonstrations of technologies, as well as associated training, at Chornobyl.

In support of building a sustainable safety culture and capabilities in Ukraine, the guiding principle of the work is to maximize the work done by Ukrainians. The intent is to build a D,D, &D technical capability within the Chornobyl plant organization that can be applied at Chornobyl as well as at other nuclear power plants in Ukraine. This goal is accomplished by defining regional D,D, &D skills early to enable Chornobyl officials to plan the necessary labor force and by providing U.S. technology and supplies as training resources.

Proceeding soon with D,D, &D has economic and safety incentives. Some 6,500 staff continue to work at Chornobyl, though Unit 3 is the only reactor now operating. The longer the shut-down reactors remain in their current status--without proceeding with deactivation--the greater the risk that highly qualified nuclear experts could leave to apply their skills elsewhere. However, the skills of some of those staff could be put to productive use in D,D, &D as soon as training can proceed. The safety incentives stem from the same situation. Though reactor Units 1 and 2 are not operating, they share electrical and fire protection systems with operating Unit 3. Therefore, it is important that qualified staff are retained to maintain systems at all the reactors until deactivation proceeds. The longer the fate of the reactors is undecided, the greater the risk that those staff will leave, thus potentially increasing safety risks.

Despite the benefits of moving ahead with D,D, &D, several challenges are associated with the work. The activities can be complex and costly. Significant nuclear safety issues associated with the shutdown of RBMK reactors will need to be resolved. The key issues have to do with the extent of decontamination necessary to minimize worker radiation doses, minimize the amount of resulting liquid waste, and control future environmental contamination. The regulatory framework for D,D, &D is just emerging in Ukraine; the nation's regulatory organization currently consists of only 70 people.

Though Ukraine has agreed in principle to shut down the Chornobyl reactors by 2000, no implementation plan yet exists to do so. In 1995, the British-based company AEA Technologies prepared a report commissioned by the European Union called Preparation of Decommissioning Operations for the RBMK Reactors No's 1, 2, and 3 at Chernobyl. However, the report represents a vision of the decommissioning outcome rather than a plan to implement it.

Chornobyl plant officials have expressed interest in moving ahead with D,D, &D work and proposed the following deliverables for a joint project:

• a comprehensive radiological and structural engineering survey of Unit 1

• a safety assessment report and detailed decommissioning work plan for Chornobyl to support the Chornobyl license application for the D,D, &D phase

• background research on issues relevant to these documents, including a study of alternative techniques for cooling pond decommissioning.

With limited resources by both countries, the work must be prioritized. It is expected that in FY 1997, work can be completed on developing the requirements for the engineering survey and for the safety assessment report, and for defining options for the cooling pond. Also this year, U.S. participants will transfer software and data to the Chornobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radioecology, in preparation for the D,D, &D work. The software, developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, will enable Chornobyl staff to estimate costs for reactor decommissioning activities and assess the radiological and chemical risks associated with various decommissioning options. If the proposed work moves ahead as planned, the remaining work in the joint project is expected to be completed in FY 1998 and 1999. The results of that work will determine the scope of future U.S. involvement.

A particular area of importance related to Chornobyl D,D, &D and plant safety is its heat plant. An existing 70-MWt heat plant is operating at Chornobyl. The heat plant provides heat to help keep the reactor in a safe standby mode when it is not operating. Thus, a reliable heat plant is needed to support deactivation activities. In addition, the heat plant provides a safety benefit for the operating Chornobyl Unit 3 reactor if it should need to be shut down in an emergency, by keeping the reactor coolant from

freezing and breaking the pipes. Pipe leaks would cause release of radioactive materials. In addition, a frozen cooling loop could prevent heat surrounding the reactor core from escaping, which could lead to a core meltdown.

The existing heat plant cannot meet the total site demand, and the thermal energy requirements of D,D, &D efforts will be even higher. In addition, the reliability and remaining life of the existing heat plant are limited. To alleviate the situation, it may be possible to increase the capacity of the existing heat plant by adding new boilers. Another option is to complete a partially constructed replacement plant at Chornobyl that was put on hold because of lack of Ukrainian resources to complete it. In the short term, the United States has committed to providing Ukraine with technical assistance in identifying options for providing adequate heat at the site. U.S. officials are discussing potential further U.S. involvement with plant management. A decision about work scope is expected to be reached in mid-1997.

8.5 Chornobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radioecology: U.S. Perspective

Speaker: Roger Anderson; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

The driving force behind establishment of the Chornobyl Center for Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste and Radioecology was a need to develop the institutional capacity, indigenous to Ukraine, to provide scientific support to the Ukrainian nuclear industry.

The center's move from concept to reality was accomplished in a little more than one year. In May 1995, Ukraine's President Kuchma and U.S. President Clinton stated their shared intent to establish an international center to address the issues at Chornobyl. From June through August 1995, representatives of Ukraine's nuclear regulatory agency Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety, the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, and the United States cooperated in preparing a preliminary development plan. In December 1995, the Chornobyl Center was included in the G-7 Action Plan addressing Chornobyl closure. Then, in April 1996, President Kuchma signed a decree to establish the center and named Dr. Valery Glygalo as the center's coordinating director. At the same time, Ukraine and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding outlining support for the creation of the center. The most recent milestone in the center's development history occurred in January 1997, when the Chornobyl nuclear power plant signed a protocol to establish a Chornobyl Center subsidiary, the Slavutych Laboratory for International Research and Technology. That protocol also contained commitments for initial facilities and staffing. Most significant was the plant's agreement to transfer Mr. Anatoly Nossovsky from Chornobyl to the center to serve as center deputy to Dr. Glygalo. This agreement reflects the outstanding support of Chornobyl nuclear power plant for the center concept.

That original concept was underlain by five key objectives:

1. to develop sustainable operational safety programs that support Ukrainian nuclear power plants

2. to help develop and maintain in-country expertise in nuclear sciences

3. to address decontamination and decommissioning, spent fuel, and waste management issues at Chornobyl and elsewhere in Ukraine

4. to provide a means for international collaboration in addressing environmental, ecological, and health issues for those areas affected by the 1996 accident

5. to help mitigate the socioeconomic impacts associated with the ultimate shutdown of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

The main emphasis throughout these objectives is the concept of "sustainability." The Ukrainian and U.S. partners working to bring the center concept to reality intended to create an institution eventually able to sustain itself without outside assistance.

The intent is that the center will develop relationships with other sources of technical expertise from around the world as well as from within Ukraine, thus becoming a truly international partnership. Such collaborations will create the potential for research and development spinoffs, as well as encourage contracts with other service providers. These activities, in turn, will enhance the center's position as a source of direct employment for Ukrainian scientists.

Although still new, the center already is attracting participants and attention from the international community. Dr. Glygalo serves as an advisor on two projects that Canada has initiated in Ukraine. France and Germany, through the RiskAudit firm in Kyiv, have begun joint projects also involving Russia and Belarus. Italy has announced its commitment to provide $3 million in financial support to the center. Potential collaborative efforts with the United Kingdom and Japan are being explored. Many other countries around the world have extended formal expressions of interest in doing work with the center.

The United States is playing a key role in establishing the Chornobyl Center as a viable, sustainable entity. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy's effort to improve international nuclear safety, U.S. specialists are involved with the center on three main fronts: management support, infrastructure development, and joint projects.

The U.S.-provided management support ranges from helping to plan for center development to assisting with center outreach and integration activities. U.S. scientist Bryan Gore has been on assignment in Slavutych since May 1996, working closely with key representatives of Ukrainian agencies and the Chornobyl nuclear power plant on plans for center development. Other U.S. experts will provide training in research and development management techniques to staff of the new center in the coming months.

The United States also is supporting the center's efforts to develop its infrastructure. A key piece of that infrastructure is the state-of-the-art telecommunications system installed recently in Slavutych. The system offers satellite-based voice, fax, and high-speed data transmission between the center's offices and U.S. Department of Energy sites and other sources of interaction and assistance in the United States. The addition of videoconferencing capability is being planned now. Another important constituent of the center's developing infrastructure is a facility for acquiring and processing nuclear data for use in safety and radiological assessments. U.S. experts have provided sophisticated computer programs and equipment to enable the center to access specific data sets and information available electronically outside Ukraine. Help with office space and basic equipment also is being provided.

In line with the objective to establish the center as a sustainable entity, the United States already has initiated several technical projects with center staff in Ukraine. Among those is an analysis of hazards posed to Chornobyl Unit 3 by the shelter surrounding the destroyed Unit 4.⁽⁾ The analysis results are undergoing technical peer review. In another joint effort, U.S. and Ukrainian researchers will develop a plan for managing Ukraine's spent nuclear fuel. U.S. specialists are providing training and technology transfer as part of the planning for ultimate D,D & D of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. Center and U.S. researchers also are working on an assessment of needs at the Chornobyl plant and shelter for three-dimensional modeling. An assessment of robotics technologies for potential use in shelter activities also is planned.

The immediate next steps in center establishment are facilities renovations (to provide permanent office space), staffing, management training, and international coordination and integration. Center research staff will comprise personnel transferred from Ukrainian government agencies and from the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. On March 1, the plant transferred 10 to 15 highly qualified personnel to the center. The United States will provide various types of training to those staff--management of research and development organizations and projects, administrative functions, and English language skills. U.S. experts also will assist the center's efforts to coordinate and integrate with the international nuclear community through informal information-sharing.

Looking ahead a little farther, we envision that the Chornobyl Center will collaborate with others in several major project areas:

• operational safety and radiological protection training (at both Chornobyl nuclear power plant and other sites in Ukraine)

• shelter monitoring, stabilization, and cleanup

• Chornobyl nuclear power plant closure and decommissioning